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Consider the following facts. In 1950 the richest ten-percent of countries attained an average
of 8.1 years of schooling whereas the poorest ten-percent of countries attained 1.3 years, a
6-fold dierence. By 2005, the dierence in schooling declined to 2-fold. The fact is that
schooling has increased faster in poor than in rich countries even though the per-capita
income gap has generally not decreased. What explains educational attainment across coun-
tries and their evolution over time? We develop a model of human capital accumulation
that emphasizes productivity and life expectancy dierences across countries and time. Cal-
ibrating the parameters of the model to reproduce historical data for the United States, we
nd that the model accounts for 95 percent of the dierence in schooling levels between rich
and poor countries in 1950 and 78 percent of the increase in schooling over time in poor
countries. The model generates a faster increase in schooling in poor than in rich economies
even when their income gap does not decrease. These results have important implications
for educational policy.
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11 Introduction
Human capital accumulation is believed to play a crucial role in understanding income dier-
ences across countries, although a precise assessment of this importance has been hindered
by the lack of empirical measures of human capital.1 A key component of human capital for-
mation is investment in schooling. Cross-country data on schooling indicates that although
educational attainment is substantially lower in poor than in rich countries, over time poor
countries have increased schooling faster than rich countries. The convergence in schooling
occurs despite the fact that the gap in income per capita across countries has generally not
decreased. The reduction in the dispersion of schooling levels is a fact that is dicult to
account for using existing explanations of schooling dierences across countries. We develop
a model of human capital accumulation that emphasizes dierences in productivity and life
expectancy to explain educational attainment across countries and over time. We nd that
the model accounts for 95 percent of the dierence in schooling levels between rich and poor
countries in 1950 and 78 percent of the increase in schooling over time in poor countries.
The model generates a faster increase in schooling in poor than in rich economies even if
their income gap does not decrease. These implications of the model are consistent with
cross-country data and have important implications for educational policy.
We combine education data from Barro and Lee (2010) and income per capita data from the
Conference Board (2010) to construct a panel dataset for 84 countries from 1950 to 2005.
We emphasize three facts. First, there are large dierences in schooling measures across
countries, with average schooling being 8 years in rich countries and only 1 year in poor
countries in 1950 (11 and 5 years in rich and poor countries in 2005). Second, average years
of schooling have increased over time in all countries in our sample. Third, average years of
1Important exceptions include Hendricks (2002) and Schoellman (2010). See also recent quantitative
work by Manuelli and Seshadri (2006) and Erosa, Koreshkova, and Restuccia (2010).
2schooling have increased more in poor than in rich countries. Hence, dispersion in schooling
levels has decreased overtime. This occurs despite the fact that dispersion in income levels
has generally not decreased. What can explain schooling dierences across countries and
their evolution over time?
We develop a model of human capital accumulation to account for these facts. The basic
features of the model are standard and build from Bils and Klenow (2000). There are two
novel and noteworthy departures from the existing literature. First, the model features
an income eect from non-homothetic preferences. Such preferences are central in theories
of structural change and we argue are important in understanding the allocation of time
between the production of goods and schooling across rich and poor countries.2 Second,
labor supply is endogenous. This feature is important because as the available data from
the International Labor Organization show there are large cross-country dierences in hours
of work {average hours are lower in rich than in poor countries{ thereby aecting schooling
decisions. Broadly speaking, consider schooling as a time-allocation problem whereby a unit
of time is allocated between the production of consumption goods, schooling, and leisure.
Then, with non-homotetic preferences, increases in productivity lead to a reallocation of time
away from the production of goods into schooling and leisure. Other things equal, abstracting
from leisure over estimates the impact of increases in productivity on schooling (and hence
over estimates the income elasticity of schooling). Other authors, such as Heckman (1976)
and Blinder and Weiss (1976), have emphasized the importance of jointly modeling labor
supply and human capital accumulation in bringing additional quantitative discipline to
human capital models.
Our strategy to discipline the forces in the model is simple. We calibrate a benchmark
2For applications in development, see for instance Laitner (2000), Kongsamut, Rebelo, and Xie (2001),
Gollin, Parente, and Rogerson (2002), and Duarte and Restuccia (2010). Other applications include the
changing patterns of trade, e.g. Markusen (2010) and Fieler (2010); the study of broader transformations in
an economy, e.g., Greenwood and Seshadri (2005); among others.
3economy to t a long time series for schooling and hours in the United States. The calibration
puts restrictions on the strength of the income eect in the model. In the data for the United
States there is substantial variation over time in hours of work, schooling, and income for our
calibration strategy to provide identication of the income eect.3 We then perform a cross-
country quantitative experiment to assess the ability of the model in explaining schooling
levels across countries and their evolution over time. In our quantitative experiment, we allow
the levels of productivity and life expectancy to vary over time and across countries. We
discipline these elements by reproducing the cross-country distribution of GDP per capita
in 1950 and 2005 as well as the cross-country relationship between life expectancy and
income in 1950 and 2005. The main result is that the model is consistent with the three
facts emphasized earlier in the cross-country and time-series data. In particular, the model
generates substantial dispersion in schooling levels across countries: in 1950, the model
accounts for 95 percent of the dierence in schooling between rich and poor countries. In
addition, the model implies a faster increase in schooling for poor countries than for rich
countries and, therefore, is consistent with the contraction in the distribution of schooling
observed in the cross-country data. This contraction occurs in the model even though, as in
the data, there is no reduction in income gaps across some groups of countries.
Our paper relates to a large literature in macroeconomics and development addressing the
disparities in schooling levels across countries. The main focus of this literature is on dier-
ences in schooling at a point in time and, as a result, most of the existing frameworks are not
designed to address the evolution of schooling over time.4 Within this literature, the closest
paper to ours is Bils and Klenow (2000) who also emphasize dierences in productivity and
3Over the period we analyze, GDP per capita in the United States increased by a factor of 10 and
average years of schooling increased by a factor of 2. The factor dierence between the richest and poorest
ten-percent of countries in 1950 is 16-fold in GDP per capita and 6-fold in average years of schooling.
4One important exception is the study of Manuelli and Seshadri (2009) that looks at the evolution of
education for a subset of Asian and Latin American countries. They nd that the model cannot account for
the substantial increase in schooling in Latin American economies that precisely fail to catch up in income
to the United States.
4life expectancy. A key dierence is that whereas Bils and Klenow (2000) mainly focus on the
cross-sectional correlation of schooling and per-capita income growth found in the empirical
literature {for instance Barro (1991), we focus on a broader dimension of the data, namely
the level and time-series dierences in schooling across countries. We also depart from Bils
and Klenow (2000)'s framework by allowing for an income eect through non-homothetic
preferences and for hours of work dierences across countries. These departures are critical
in understanding the convergence pattern in educational attainment across countries. Our
paper relates to a recent literature in macroeconomics assessing the role of human capital in
development, for instance Manuelli and Seshadri (2006) and Erosa, Koreshkova, and Restuc-
cia (2010). The focus of this literature is on the amplication eect of human capital in
explaining income gaps across countries. Our framework abstracts from features that gen-
erate amplication eects since this is not our focus. Incorporating amplication eects in
the model would reduce the size of productivity gaps needed to reproduce income dierences
across countries in the quantitative experiments without altering our main ndings. Another
related paper is Cordoba and Ripoll (2010) that consider a model where fertility, mortality,
credit constraints, and access to public education drive schooling dierences across coun-
tries. We complement this work by emphasizing the time series dimension of the data. More
importantly, we assess the contribution of productivity and life expectancy to schooling in a
framework without frictions.
Our paper is also related to a broad literature that studies the impact of particular educa-
tional policies.5 Our results highlight the importance of productivity (and life expectancy)
in explaining a large portion of schooling dierences across countries and, as a result, have
novel and substantial implications for educational policy. The results emphasize the need to
address the factors driving low productivity in poor countries. Even though there is room
for other factors to be relevant such as credit constraints for investment in education, re-
5See, for instance, Duo (2001).
5strictions on school infrastructure, aid and policy, among others; our results stress the need
for greater focus on the productivity problem in poor countries.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we present the facts from a panel
dataset of 84 countries from 1950 to 2005 for a measure of educational attainment and
income. Section 3 presents the model. In Section 4 we calibrate the model. Section 5
performs a quantitative analysis of cross-country dierences productivity and life expectancy
in explaining the patterns in the panel data. We conclude in Section 6.
2 Facts
Data We construct a panel dataset of schooling and income as follows. We obtain average
years of schooling for the population aged 25 to 29 from Barro and Lee (2010). We restrict
the sample to the narrow age population to minimize the impact of demographics and other
changes on schooling measures across time and space. It is also the denition that is best
suited for the historical data on educational attainment we use for the United States and for
the model we consider in Section 3. The schooling data is available for a large set of countries
from 1950 to 2005 in 5 year intervals. We obtain gross domestic product (GDP) per capita
from the Conference Board (2010), Total Economy Database. We restrict the time frame of
this data from 1950 to 2005. To abstract from short-run uctuations in real GDP we lter it
using the Hodrick and Prescott (1997) lter with  = 100 for yearly observations and keep
the trend component of these time series. When we merge these two sets of data, we end
up with a sample of 84 countries that have available data for schooling and GDP per capita
from 1950 to 2005.6
6Our sample of 84 countries comprises a fairly representative set of the world's income distribution. For
instance, the factor dierence in GDP per capita between the richest and poorest ve-percent of countries
is 25-fold which is comparable to many previous studies.
6Facts We emphasize three sets of facts that arise from analyzing these data. First, school-
ing dierences across countries are large at any point in time between 1950 to 2005. Second,
schooling increases over time in all countries in our sample. Third, schooling dierences
across countries are smaller in 2005 than they were in 1950. The reduction in schooling
dierences across countries is systematic and occurs despite the fact that the income gap
between rich and poor countries has not generally decreased. We now document these facts
in detail.
1. There are large dierences in educational attainment across countries.
Consider Table 1 which decomposes our sample into ten groups of countries according
to the 1950 distribution of GDP per capita {i.e., the countries in each decile are the
same in 1950 and in 2005. For each decile, the table reports the average GDP per capita
relative to the United States and the average years of schooling. In 1950 there is a
6-fold dierence in schooling between the richest and poorest decile of the distribution.
In 2005 there remains a noticeable 2-fold dierence. These dierences are not specic
to the top and bottom decile and/or to the initial and end year of our sample. Figure 1
documents them across all countries, for selected years, and shows that there has been
a signicant dispersion of schooling across all levels of income and at all dates. To put
the magnitude of cross-country dierences in schooling in perspective, consider that in
1900 in the United States a 35-year old had completed about 7.4 years of schooling.
Hence, a 25-29 year old in 2005 in the average poor country still had 2 years less of
schooling than a 35-year old in the United Sates in 1900.7
2. Educational attainment increased over time in all countries.
Schooling increased between 1950 and 2005 for every country in our sample. Table 1
conveys an aggregated view of this fact since average years of schooling increase for
7The gure 7.4 years of schooling for the average 35-year old is from Goldin and Katz (2008). Table 1
shows that the years of schooling for the average 25-29 year old in the average poor country is 5.07 in 2005.
7each decile of the distribution. The increase in schooling between 1950 and 2005 is
37 percent for countries in the top decile and 299 percent for countries in the bottom
decile. We note that the increase in educational attainment is positive for all deciles
of the income distribution regardless of the initial income level or subsequent income
growth relative to the United States. We expand on this fact next.
3. Dierences in educational attainment across countries have been reduced substantially
over time.
Poor countries exhibit a tendency to increase their schooling faster than rich countries.
In Table 1 this is evidenced by the tendency of the 2005-to-1950 ratio of schooling (last
column) to decrease with relative income. This is a remarkable nding given that for
some deciles, such as the second and the fourth, relative income did not change between
1950 and 2005. For deciles such as the third or the fth relative income increased and
for the tenth decile relative income decreased. Yet, each group of countries experienced
a substantial increase in schooling. A more complete and systematic documentation
of the decline in schooling dispersion across countries is to report for each year the
cross-sectional elasticity of schooling to income levels, as in Figure 2.8 This elasticity
decreases systematically over time. For instance, whereas two countries that dier in
income per capita by one percent have in average a 0.6% dierence in schooling in
1950, their schooling dierence is reduced by half to 0.3% in 2005. The same declining
pattern is observed for the time-series elasticity, that is the elasticity of income levels to
schooling for each country over time, although with only 12 observations per country
the pattern has more noise.
In summary, even though there are still large dierences in educational attainment across
countries, we nd that these dierences have been systematically reduced with poor countries
8In each year, we regress the log of average years of schooling (for people 25-29 years old) on a constant
and the log of GDP per capita, and report the slope coecient in Figure 2.
8increasing their educational attainment over time faster than rich countries. While we have
reported these facts for individuals 25-29 years of age, we emphasize that the facts are robust
to other age categories and for males and females. Moreover, the convergence pattern is also
robust to a broader set of countries. The convergence pattern becomes even stronger if we
consider all 146 countries in Barro and Lee (2010)'s data set. Table A.1 in the appendix
reports average years of schooling for people 25-29 for countries by deciles of the schooling
distribution in 1950 using the entire sample in Barro and Lee (2010). The countries with
lowest schooling in 1950 (Decile 1) increased their educational attainment from 0.3 to 4.1
years whereas those countries with the highest schooling in 1950 (Decile 10) increased their
schooling from 8.7 to 11.7 years. Hence, the factor dierence in educational attainment
between these groups of countries declined from a 31-fold in 1950 to less than 3-fold in 2005.
3 The Model
Time is continuous. The world comprises a set of closed economies and hence in what
follows we focus on a single economy to describe the model. At every moment a generation
of homogeneous individuals of size one is born and lives for an interval of time of length
T. The index  denotes an individual's generation: the date at which the individual is
of age 0. We use t to refer to calendar time. Individuals are endowed with one unit of
productive time at each moment and no assets at birth. There is a worldwide rate of interest
r at which borrowing and lending can occur without constraint. The payment to a unit of
human capital-hour is denoted by zt at moment t. We generically refer to zt as productivity
and assume it grows at a time invariant rate g.
9Preferences
Preferences are dened over lifetime sequences of consumption and leisure time as well as
over time spent in school. We abstract from life-cycle considerations by imposing that
consumption and leisure time remain constant throughout the individual's life. Hence, the
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where  is the subjective rate of discount assumed to be equal to the rate of interest, c







where  > 0 and
W(s) = ln(s):
We also assume that
U(c) = ln(c    c);
where  c introduces a non-homotheticity which has the standard interpretation of a sub-
sistence level above which consumption must remain at every point in time. This feature
9We note that our assumption of constant consumption over the lifecycle is not too restrictive since with
separable utility in consumption and leisure and r =  an individual optimally chooses a constant path
of consumption. However, these assumptions do not guarantee a constant path of leisure. We impose a
constant leisure prole over the lifecycle for simplicity. In addition, we do not have detailed data on the
lifecycle behavior of labor supply for generations dating back to the 19th century and the changes in lifecycle
labor supply for recent cohorts are small in comparison with the variation in hours over time. Hence, we
think there is little benet to modeling labor supply over the lifecycle since our focus is on changes across
countries and over time.
10of preferences plays an important role in both the theoretical and quantitative properties
of the model. In particular, when income is suciently large (alternatively when  c = 0),
preferences display the standard property in modern macroeconomics where income and
substitution eects of changes in productivity cancel each other and labor supply {as well
as schooling{ are constant. Hence, the long-run properties of this model are standard in
macroeconomics. But when income is relatively low ( c > 0) both schooling and leisure are
increasing in productivity.10
Human Capital Technology
Individuals can acquire human capital by spending time in school and purchasing educational











where x represents purchases of educational services whose relative price is denoted by q.
These services are purchased up front. Hence, x is more appropriately described as the
present value of educational services. The parameter  2 (0;1) measures the elasticity of
human capital to educational services. At an optimum  is the share of lifetime income
spent by an individual in educational services. The parameters  > 0 and   >  1 govern
the importance of the time input in the production of human capital.
10The non-homothetic feature of preferences is common to a broad literature that emphasizes the shift
in economic activity from agriculture to manufacturing and services such as Gollin, Parente, and Rogerson
(2002) and Duarte and Restuccia (2010); models of the allocation of hours such as Rogerson (2008), models
of the dynamics of saving rates such as Christiano (1989), among many other applications. See Atkeson and
Ogaki (1996) for empirical evidence from micro and macro data.
11Optimization

















Our assumptions that consumption and leisure are constant throughout the life cycle and
that the rate of interest equals the subjective discount rate imply that the optimization
problem can also be written more compactly as:
max
c;`;x;s
fa [U(c) + V (`)] + W(s) : ac + x = z(1   `)H(s;x)d(s)g;
where a =
R T
0 e udu and d(s) =
R T
s e(g r)udu are discount terms. Note that the discount
term for education includes the foregone labor income of s years of schooling.











+ (1   )W
0(s) = 0: (2)
We make two remarks about this equation. First, when individuals derive no utility from
schooling (i.e.,  = 0), the optimal level of schooling s is determined by setting the term
in parenthesis in (2) to zero. In this case, the optimal level of schooling maximizes lifetime
income. To see this, note that z(1   `)xh(s)d(s) is lifetime income and its derivative
with respect to schooling relative to lifetime income gives exactly the term in parenthesis.
An increase in s raises lifetime income through human capital accumulation h0(s)=h(s) and
reduces lifetime income by the foregone time working d0
(s)=d(s). With  = 0 schooling is
12independent of productivity and may dier across generations only through changes in the
function d such as changes in life expectancy T. Second, when individuals derive utility
from schooling ( > 0) the term in parenthesis is negative: the individual chooses more
schooling than needed to maximize lifetime income. Third, productivity appears in the
equation for optimal schooling only through consumption, that is through the intertemporal
budget constraint in (1). The term U0(c)c is critical, therefore, in driving the eect of




c    c
:
To illustrate the properties of this function, consider an increasing path of income and
consumption. At low levels of income consumption is close to  c and the term U0(c)c is large.
Increases in income, reduce the value of U0(c)c and since the term in parenthesis in (2) is
negative the left-hand side of (2) increases so that optimal schooling increases. As income
rises the term U0(c)c asymptotes 1 and s becomes invariant to changes in income. Hence,
qualitatively the model delivers the observed pattern in the data that schooling increases
faster for poor than for rich countries.
The rst order condition for leisure is
U
0(c)c   (1   )V
0(`)(1   `) = 0: (3)
Given the functional form for V , the term V 0(`)(1   `) is decreasing in `. Hence, as income
grows and U0(c)c decreases towards 1, leisure time increases. Asymptotically, leisure time
is constant. Note that our choice of U(c) implies that this asymptotic value of ` is in the
interior of (0;1).11
11Functions such as U(c) = [(c   c)1   1]=(1 ); where  > 1 imply that U0(c)c ! 0 as c ! 1. In this
case the asymptotic long-run value for leisure time is one.
13We dene y as the period income of an individual of generation  at age 35:
y = ze
35g(1   `)H(s;x):
Since we use this measure in our quantitative analysis, we emphasize how increases in produc-
tivity aect income. First, an increase in productivity raises income through three channels:
a direct eect through z; an indirect eect through increases in schooling s; and another
indirect eect through increases in expenditures in education x and therefore human capital.
Second, an increase in productivity induces an increase in leisure time and therefore reduce
labor income. The increase in leisure hinders the incentive to acquire education.
4 Calibration
We calibrate a benchmark economy to the time-series data for the United States. Although
the emphasis of our quantitative exercise is on the cross-country implications from 1950 to
2005, we calibrate the model using the longest possible time series of the variables of interest
for the United States. The motivation for this strategy is simple. Since the key channel
in the model is the strength of the income eect on schooling and hours of work, the time
path of these variables in the United States provides quantitative discipline. The long time
series allows for better identication of the parameters of the model. In particular, as is well
documented for the United States over time, there is a long-run increase in schooling followed
by a slowdown toward the end of the 20th century. Similarly, there is a long-run decline
in weekly hours followed by a slowdown. Our calibration procedure exploits these changing
trends to discipline the strength of the income eect that is central to the quantitative
implications of the model across countries.
14For the United States, the schooling data that we use is provided by Claudia Goldin and
Larry Katz and serve as the basis of Figures 1.4, 1.5 and 1.6 in their book.12 The data give
years of schooling by birth cohort, completed at age 35 for white people starting in 1876
until 1975. We HP-ltered the time series and used, for calibration purposes, cohorts from
1880 to 1965. These cohorts of people are of age 35 in years 1915 through 2000. The trend in
schooling shows that a 35-year-old person in 1915 had completed about 8 years of schooling
while the same-age person in 2000 had completed close to 14 years.13
The hours data that we use are built from various sources. For the period 1830 to 1880 we use
data from Whaples (1990, Table 2.1), for the period 1890 to 1940 we use data from Kendrick
(1961, Table A-IX), and for the period 1950 to 2000 we use data reported by McGrattan
and Rogerson (2004, Table 1).14 We HP-ltered the data and linearly interpolate between
census dates to build a time series of hours from 1830 through 2000. The trend shows a
decline from close to 72 hours per week in 1830 to 40 hours in 2000. Importantly, the rate of
this decline is non-constant. There is a moderate decline in hours from 1830 to about 1910,
followed by a sharp decline until about 1980, and a substantial attening after 1980. The fact
that the workweek declined signicantly in the United States has been recognized elsewhere.
Rogerson (2006), for example, uses data from Whaples (1990) and proposes to rationalize
the decline in the workweek using non-homothetic preferences similar to our specication.
Maddison (1987, Table A-9) and Huberman and Minns (2007, Table 1) show patterns of
hours over time for countries such as Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy,
Japan, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the U.K. between 1870 and 1990
that are similar to the pattern in the United States.
12See Goldin and Katz (2008, Figures 1.4{1.6).
13We veried that the Goldin and Katz data used for calibration is consistent with the Barro and Lee data
for the United States for the period 1950 to 2000.
14The Whaples data are weekly hours worked collected from two surveys of manufacturing hours taken by
the federal government in the context of the 1880 Census. The Kendrick data are average weekly hours in
the private non-farm sector, nally the McGrattan and Rogerson data are average weekly hours worked for
all workers.
15The hours data are available in calendar time while the model predicts hours by generation.
We choose to associate the 1830 hours data with the 1795 generation from the model, i.e. the
generation that is 35 years old in 1830. That is, when we compare the model's predictions
to the U.S. data we compare the hours chosen by the 1795 generation in the model with the
1830 data on hours. We associate subsequent data points and generations in the same way,
until the 1965 generation which corresponds to individuals reaching age 35 in 2000. Thus,
our calibration procedure implies that we compute decisions for 171 generations, starting
from the 1795 generation and ending with the 1965 generation.
To calibrate the model lifespan T we note that its empirical counterpart is not life expectancy
per se but rather the sum of years spent in school and on the labor market for a generation.
Hazan (2009) reports market years for cohorts born in 1840;1850;:::;1930: We combine this
data with Goldin and Katz's gures for years of schooling achieved by these generations to
obtain a measure of T for cohorts born in 1840;1850;:::;1930: We then estimate a linear
time trend for T:
T = aT + bT; (4)
and use it to compute T for all cohorts of the model.15
We now discuss the specication of the non-homothetic preference term  c. This term is
critical for the calibration of hours over time and as a result for the implications of the
model for poor countries. While it is critical in our model to have non-homothetic preferences
( c > 0) for schooling to vary over time, regardless of the specication, the parameters of the
human capital technology allow for an excellent t of the schooling data. What we nd is
that our model with constant  c implies an income elasticity of hours that falls exponentially
15We nd ^ aT =  274:7819 and ^ bT = 0:1692. The standard error for the intercept and slope terms are
16:16 and 0:008. The linear trend ts the data very well with r2 = 0:99.
16as income rises. With constant income growth this implies that hours fall exponentially over
time. This pattern of hours in the model can t the U.S. hours data from 1910 onwards
but not the pattern before 1910. Since the United States was poorer before 1910 than
nowadays, tting the income elasticity of hours at low levels of income has implications
for the model's predictions about poor countries. Hence, allowing  c to vary over time is
critical to reproducing the historical time series of hours of work in the United States and to
analyzing poor economies. In particular, for the model to t the hours data in the United
States before 1910,  c must be lower before 1910. This implies that the model generates a
lower income elasticity of hours (and therefore schooling) than with a constant  c. To allow
for a exible specication of  c over time that we can estimate with data while still retaining
the long-run implications of the model with a constant  c, we specify a transformed version
of the logistic function as follows:
 c(z) =

1 + exp( z + !)
;
where  and ! are parameters to be determined. With constant productivity growth,  c(z) is
asymptotically constant and hence the long-run properties of the model remain as discussed
previously.16 While this feature of the model is only motivated by the behavior of the
hours data, we note that there is an empirically plausible structural interpretation of time-
varying  c that can be derived from a model with household production. Intuitively, as home
hours are substituted with market hours, more market goods are used to provide minimum
consumption. Substitution of hours depends on preference and technology parameters such
as the rates of growth of market and home productivity. To the extent that we cannot
empirically pin down these growth rates, we opted for a reduced-form approach. We explore
a quantitative version of such home production model in the Appendix.
16In Section 5.3, we explicitly estimate and explore the implications of the model assuming a constant  c
over time.
17We now describe the details of the calibration procedure. We start the calibration of the
model by normalizing the productivity parameter z1795 = 1. We set the discount factor to
4 percent, i.e.,  = 0:04 and, following Bils and Klenow (2000), we choose  = 0:1. We
pick the rest of the parameters in order to minimize a measure of distance between the
model's predictions and relevant U.S. data. Specically, let  be the vector of parameters to
calibrate:
 = (;;;!;; ;;g)
0;
and let ^ st() and ^ nt() represent optimal schooling and work time of generation . Let s
and n be their empirical counterpart: s is years of schooling for generation  in the U.S.
data and n is the workweek at date  +35 in the U.S. data. The mapping of hours between
the model and the data is done by assuming that there are 112 hours of discretionary time
per week.17 Hence, a 40-hour workweek corresponds to 40=112 units of work time in the
model. Finally, our calibration procedure also targets a growth rate in income per capita of


























Table 2 shows the values of the calibrated parameters. Figures 3 and 4 show the excellent
t of the model to the U.S. data on schooling and hours. Note how the time series of hours
implied by the model ts the changing pattern of the rate of change in actual hours. The
calibrated function of  c(z) permits this t. We show that when  c(z) is constant, the best t
the model can produce for the time series of hours is a strictly convex pattern that fails to
t the changing pattern in hours over time prior to 1910.
Given our calibration strategy, it should not be surprising that our model implies, as in the
17Assuming that a person needs 8 hours for sleep and other necessities, there are (24  8)7 = 112 hours
of discretionary time in a week.
18data reported by Hazan (2009), that years spent on the labor market increases while total
lifetime hours decrease across generations. Nevertheless, for the sake of comparison with the
data we report the implications of the model for the 1840 and 1930 cohorts. We nd that
time in the labor market in the model is 31 years for the 1840 cohort (34 years in the data)
whereas for the 1930 cohort it is 40 years (40 years in the data). In terms of lifetime hours
the model implies 103,830 hours for the 1840 cohort and 85,780 hours for the 1930 cohort.
The data for these cohorts is 103,324 and 77,502.18
The calibrated values of  and ! imply that  c(z) reaches its long-term value given by  around
1910. We compute the ratio of  to the income of the last generation in the benchmark
economy and nd it to be 2%. It is not obvious how to compare this value with data. One
possibility is to relate it to the nal expenditures on food relative to GDP.19 For the United
States, the expenditure share of food is 5.2% in 1996. Another possibility is to compare
the incomes of countries far back in time. Maddison (2009) reports that GDP per capita
in Western Europe between 1 and 1500 was between 450 and 771 at constant 1990 dollars,
representing a range of 2 to 4.5 percent of the 1970 GDP per capita. Since measured income
is likely to be lower due to non market production, we conclude that the value of  relative
to income of 2% is reasonable in light of the related evidence.
5 Cross-Country Experiments
We conduct quantitative experiments using the calibrated model to assess the importance of
productivity and life expectancy in explaining educational attainment across countries and
over time.
18We compute market years of generation  as T   s and lifetime hours as (T   s)(1   `)  52.
19The data is for the 1996 Benchmark study of the International Comparison Program.
195.1 Baseline Experiment
We use the calibration of the benchmark economy and assume that countries are identical
except in terms of productivity and life expectancy. In particular, we assume that countries
dier in the initial level and growth of productivity z and g; and in the level and rate of
change in life expectancy. We discipline our choice of life expectancy across countries by
estimating two cross-sectional relationships between life expectancy and GDP per capita for
1950 and 2005. We then search for 10 combinations of z and g that match the relative
income gaps in 1950 and 2005, as described in Table 1, while imposing that life expectancy
in 1950 and 2005 be as described by the estimated cross-sectional relationships. A detailed
description of this procedure is in the appendix. Table 3 displays the results of our baseline
experiments. The implied values of z, g, and T for the rst and last generations for each
economy are reported in the rst four columns. Before we describe the results in detail, we
emphasize that even though our framework abstracts from amplication income eects such
as those emphasized in Manuelli and Seshadri (2006) and Erosa, Koreshkova, and Restuccia
(2010), the results from our quantitative experiments would not be aected. Amplication
eects would reduce the size of the productivity gaps needed to reproduce the calibrated
income dierences across countries leaving the impact of income on schooling the same.
There are two sets of results that we emphasize from Table 3: the cross-sectional implications
of the model relative to the data in 1950 and the time-series behavior across countries relative
to the data. We start with the cross-sectional implications in 1950. We nd that the model
accounts for 95 percent of the dierence in schooling between countries in the 1st decile and
the United States. To understand how we obtain this statistic, note that for countries in the
poorest decile of income in 1950, the model implies 1:7 years of schooling whereas the data
is 1:27 years (see Table 1). In 1950 the United States has 10:45 years of schooling which
is closely reproduced by our calibrated benchmark economy. Hence, the model accounts
20for (10:5   1:7)=(10:5   1:27) = 95% of the dierence. The model accounts for a lower
percentage of schooling dierences for countries in higher deciles of income: 89% for the
5th decile and 33% for the 10th decile. Therefore, there is a systematic tendency for the
model to account for lower fractions of the schooling data as we consider richer countries.
This is because the mechanisms emphasized in our theory (non-homotheticy in preferences
and life expectancy) vanish at high levels of income to eventually play no role. For rich
countries, factors other than income levels have rst-order importance in the determination
of schooling, e.g., public policy towards education, labor market institutions that compress
wages, among many others. In poor countries, however, increases in productivity and income
allow individuals to move farther away from subsistence consumption having a rst-order
eect on the allocation of time in schooling.
We now turn to the time-series implications of schooling across countries. We nd that the
model accounts for 78 percent of the increase in schooling in poor countries. We compute
this statistic as follows. For the economy in the 1st decile, schooling increases from 1:7 years
in 1950 to 5:1 in 2005, a ln(5:1=1:7)=55 = 1:99% annual increase. It compares with 2:56% in
the data. Thus, for this economy, the model accounts for 1:99=2:56 = 78% of the increase
in schooling. Similarly, for countries in the 5th and 10th deciles the model accounts for 82
and 125% of the increase in schooling. We note from Table 3 that schooling increases in all
economies in our model, an implication that is consistent with the data. We also note the
tendency for poor economies to increase their schooling faster than richer economies even
though they are not necessarily catching up in relative income since the evolution of relative
income exactly matches the data. As a consequence of this faster increase in schooling in
poor economies, schooling dierences in the model are smaller in 2005 than in 1950. This
implication of the model is also consistent with the data. In particular, it is consistent with
the decline in the income elasticity of schooling across countries over time displayed in Figure
2. Using Table 3, we compute an approximation of this elasticity with the ratio of relative
21changes in schooling and income between deciles of the distributions. Comparing the 1st and
10th decile in Table 3, we nd an elasticity of 0.62 (i.e., ln(9:7=1:7)=ln(0:83=0:05)) in 1950
versus 0.41 in 2005. Again, the decrease of this elasticity is evidence of the reduced dispersion
in schooling across countries in 2005 and, therefore, of the faster increase in schooling in
poorer countries. Comparing the 1st and 5th deciles in Table 3 yields elasticities of 0.78 and
0.43 in 1950 and 2005. Comparing the 5th and 10th deciles yields 0.53 and 0.32. In the data
of Figure 2 this elasticity decreases from 0.6 to 0.27.
In terms of hours there is limited data that can be brought to bear on the implications of
the model. Nevertheless, we use the available hours data from the Conference Board (2010).
They report yearly hours per worker and we plot the data against GDP per capita in Figure
5. We note that not only hours of work decline with income in 1950 and 2005, but also hours
decrease as income rises for each country and hours fall faster for the poor than the rich
countries. In the data in 1950, hours of work in poor countries relative to rich is about 1.4,
while the same ratio drops to 1.2 in 2005. In the model, the ratio of hours in the poorest
economy relative to the benchmark is 2.4 in 1950 and drops to 1.7 in 2005. The ratio of
hours between an economy in the 5th decile and the benchmark is 1.6 in 1950 and drops
to 1.3 in 2005. While the comparison here is very crude since hours data is missing for the
poorest countries, the rough comparison suggests that the hours implications of the model
are broadly in line with the data in terms of both the magnitude of hours dierences in 1950
and the faster decline in hours over time in poor countries.
5.2 Equal Growth Rates across Countries
To illustrate the importance of dierences in productivity growth and changes in life ex-
pectancy across countries, we conduct two additional experiments. First, we conduct an
22experiment similar to the baseline except that we assume that the rate of growth of produc-
tivity, g, is the same in all countries at the value in the benchmark economy. In a second
experiment we assume that in addition the change in life expectancy over time is also the
same across countries at the value in the benchmark economy. Essentially, we show with
these experiments that the implications of the model for the cross-country dierences in
schooling in 1950 are not substantially aected by the dierential growth components. We
also show that even when abstracting from dierences in productivity growth and changes in
life expectancy, the model still accounts for a substantial portion of the changes in schooling
over time across countries.
In the rst experiment, we follow the baseline except that we assume equal productivity
growth g across countries. Results are reported in Table 4. In the 1950 cross-section the
model accounts for 92 percent of the dierence in schooling between countries in the 1st
decile and the United States. This compares to 95 percent in the baseline. At the 5th and
9th deciles the numbers are 88 and 34 percent (89 and 33 in the baseline). Turning to the
time-series implications, the model with equal g across economies implies that in the 1st
decile, the model accounts for 68 percent of the increase in schooling versus 78% in the
baseline experiment. In the 5th decile the number is 78% (82% in the baseline). Just as in
the baseline, the model with equal g predicts a narrowing of the schooling gap relative to
income as observed in the data. As discussed previously, we compute an approximation of
the cross-country income elasticity of schooling in 1950 and 2005 and show that the implied
elasticity is lower in 2005 than in 1950. Comparing the 1st and 10th decile, we nd that the
income elasticity of schooling falls from 0.58 to 0.36. The corresponding gures, when we
compare the 1st and 5th decile are 0.67 and 0.52 and when we compare the 5th and 10th
they are 0.52 and 0.23.
In the second experiment, we follow the previous experiment and assume in addition that
23the change in life expectancy for each country is the same as in the benchmark economy.
That is, relative to the previous experiment, life expectancy in 1950 is unchanged but the
life expectancy in 2005 is 9.3 years above that of 1950 for all countries, which is the years
increase in life expectancy in the benchmark economy between 1950 and 2005. The results of
this experiment are reported in Table 5. We rst note that the cross-sectional implications in
1950 of the model in this experiment and the previous experiment are identical.20 In terms
of the time series, abstracting from dierences in rate of change of T reduces the ability of
the model to account for the increase in schooling. Nevertheless, even when abstracting from
dierences in productivity growth and changes in life expectancy, the model accounts 50%
of the growth rate of schooling in the 1st decile. At the 5th decile the corresponding gure
is 50%. The model also implies a faster growth in schooling in poor than in rich countries.
5.3 Importance of  c(z)
We assess the quantitative importance of the assumption that  c is time-varying. We conduct
an experiment where we assume a constant  c. We calibrate the benchmark economy to U.S.
data as in Section 4. The list of parameters to be determined by the minimization program
is now (;;; c; ;;g)0. Figure 6 shows the t of this version of the model against the
U.S. data. While this version of the model ts the time path for schooling as well as in the
baseline, the implied time path of hours exhibits a convex shape that fails to t the time
series of hours, particularly in the earlier period. A consequence of this convex shape is that
hours increase fast as productivity declines, potentially leading to unreasonable predictions
about hours of work for poor countries.
20This is due to the fact that, by design, the experiment implies that the level of life expectancy and
income are the same in 1950. The only dierence between the two experiments is the level of life expectancy
in 2005.
24We conduct the same cross-country experiment as described in Section 5.1 using the cali-
brated parameters of the benchmark economy with a constant  c. Table 6 reports the results.
The model generates such large eects on hours and schooling for poor countries that it is
not possible to compute economies corresponding to levels of income below that of decile 8,
i.e. an economy that is 37 percent of the income per-capita in the benchmark economy in
1950. The results for the economy in the 9th decile (an economy with 59% relative income in
1950) show that hours and schooling are magnied in the model with constant  c compared
to the baseline: hours of work for this economy are 62.6 versus 54.6 in the baseline and
schooling is 6.7 years versus 7.9 years in the baseline. Thus, even at this level of relative
income the labor supply elasticity is very high (as suggested by Figure 6) and the predictions
for schooling are magnied as a result. The implications of the larger response of hours and
schooling to productivity changes in this version of the model are even more striking when
comparing a poorer economy. The poorest economy we are able to compute in this version
of the model is an economy whose relative income in 1950 is 55 percent of the benchmark
economy.21 Note this economy is much closer to the economy in decile 9 than decile 8. Hours
of work in this economy are 111.5 (out of a total 112 hours) compared to 62.9-54.6 hours
in the 8th and 9th decile economies in the baseline and schooling is 3.3 years compared to
6.2-7.9 years in the 8th and 9th decile economies in the baseline.
6 Conclusions
We developed a model of human capital accumulation to quantitatively assess the importance
of productivity and life expectancy in explaining dierences in educational attainment across
countries and over time. We calibrated a benchmark economy to reproduce the historical
21We assume that this economy features the same growth rate in labor productivity as the average country
in the 8th decile.
25evolution of schooling and hours in the United States. We found that the model accounts for
95 percent of the dierence in schooling between rich and poor countries in 1950. The model
accounts for 78 percent of the increase in schooling levels over time in poor countries. The
model generates a faster increase in schooling levels in poor than in rich countries. Hence,
the model explains the convergence in cross-country schooling levels observed in the data
even though the per-capita income gap between these countries has generally not decreased.
Our results emphasize the importance of productivity (and life expectancy) in explaining the
bulk of dierences in educational attainment across countries and their evolution over time.
These results have important implications for educational policy as they shift the focus of
attention from frictions and market imperfections to the determinants of low productivity
in poor countries. Nevertheless, we think that extending our framework to incorporate
complementary factors such as credit market frictions and public education (such as school
infrastructure) can yield additional insights. We leave these important extensions of the
model for future work.
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30A Schooling Data
Table A.1 reports average years of schooling for people 25 to 29 years of age for countries
by deciles of the schooling distribution in 1950. The data is from Barro and Lee (2010)
and includes the entire sample of 147 countries. Compared to the dispersion in schooling
between rich and poor countries in our restricted sample in Table 1, the larger sample in
Table A.1 shows that the pattern of convergence in schooling across countries over time is
even stronger, with the schooling gap between countries in the tenth and rst deciles being
a factor of 31-fold in 1950 and less than 3-fold in 2005.
Table A.1: Average Years of Schooling across Countries
Decile s50 s05 s05=s50
1 0:28 4:06 14:60
2 0:60 6:11 10:26
3 1:07 7:02 6:57
4 1:58 7:34 4:66
5 2:41 8:63 3:58
6 3:39 9:64 2:85
7 4:40 10:11 2:30
8 5:28 10:74 2:03
9 6:85 11:26 1:64
10 8:73 11:69 1:34
R10=1 31:41 2:88  
Note: s is average years of schooling of the 25-29 year
old population. Numbers reported are the average of
each decile. The countries in each decile are the same
in each year and represent the 1950 distribution of
schooling.
31B Structural Model of Time Varying  c
We describe a structural interpretation of the time-varying  c in our baseline model and show
its empirical plausibility. Since the issue of time-varying  c pertains to the model's ability to
t the labor supply data in the time series, we abstract from life-cycle and schooling decisions
in what follows.
Suppose that an individual lives for one period and has preferences represented by
ln(C(cm;cn)    m) + ln(`);
where cm and cn are consumption of a market and a non-market good. The variable `
represents leisure time and  m is a constant. The function C aggregates the consumption of
the market and home good. Assume that C(cm;cn) = cm + (1   )cn: The home good is
produced with time, in line with the technology cn = znh where  2 (0;1), h is the time
devoted to home production and zn is productivity in the home technology. The budget
constraint of the individual is cm = zm(1 ` h); where zm stands in for market productivity.
The individual's optimization problem is then
max
cm;h;`
fln(cm + (1   )znh
    m) + ln(`) : cm + zm(h + `) = zmg:











































Dene labor supply as n = 1   `   h and income as y = zmn:
Note a few points. First, the utility derived from consumption can be written as ln(cm  
 c(zm;zn)) where  c(zm;zn) =  m (1 )znh is analogous to the time-varying  c in our baseline
model. This object is a decreasing function of home hours. Second, if market productivity
grows fast enough relative to home productivity, home hours are high and  c low at low levels
of income. Hence, the model can deliver the feature discussed in Section 4 that the time-
varying  c must be lower at low levels of income. Third, if market productivity grows faster
than home productivity, leisure time converges to a constant between 0 and 1 in the long
run. Fourth, we assumed perfect substitutability between home and market consumption
for the sake of simplicity. Allowing for a CES aggregator of home and market consumption
would enhance the model's ability to t the time series of work hours.
We now investigate the ability of this model to t the hours data. Let zm and zn grow
at constant rates: zm; = zm;1830egm( 1830) and zn; = zn;1830egn( 1830): Normalize the level
of market productivity zm;1830 = 1 and dene the following vector of 7 parameters to be
determined:
 = (gm;gn;;  m;;;zn;1830)
0
and dene ^ n() and ^ y() as hours and income at date  and let n be actual hours. In
33Figure B.1: Work Hours { Model with Household Production and Constant Subsistence




































We nd  = 2:3,  = 0:72,  m = 0:47 and  = 0:38. The rate of growth of market and home
productivity are gm = 0:024 and gn = 0:004. The behavior of market hours is represented
in Figure B.1. The model predicts that home and market hours are declining over time and
leisure time is increasing.
C Cross-Country Experiments
We describe in detail our strategy to restrict the four parameters varying across countries in
the cross-country experiments in Section 5. These parameters are the level and growth rate
of productivity (z;g) and the life expectancy of the 1915 generation (reaching 35 in 1950)
and the 1970 generation (reaching 35 in 2005).
The empirical measure of T used for the benchmark economy that is best suited for the
34model is the sum of years spent in school and on the labor market for a generation. The
same data is not readily available for the time period and set of countries that we analyze.
Hence, our approach to calibrating T across countries and time is described in two steps:
1. We estimate an empirical relationship observed across countries between life expectancy
at birth and income per capita as follows:
Life Expectancy = slope  ln(GDP per capita) + constant + error:
We estimate this relationship for two time periods. We start with life expectancy of the
1915 generation. There does not exists a wealth of data to estimate this relationship.
Thus, we use the data from Preston (1975) pertaining to the 1930s.22 The estimated
relationship ts the data very well with an adjusted r2 = 0:82. The estimated slope
coecient is 9.481. We estimate the same relationship for life expectancy of the 1970's
generation using data from the World Bank Development Indicators and Penn World
Tables. The t of the data is also very good with an r2 = 0:52 and an estimated slope
coecient of 7.1684. The assumed empirical relationship implies that the dierence
in life expectancy between any two economies at a point in time is given by the slope











We use this relationship for 1915 and 1970 and the life expectancy for the benchmark
economy to estimate the implied life expectancy for all economies in our cross-country
experiments.
2. For each of the 10 economies we consider we search for an initial level and a growth
22Preston also oers data for the 1900s but this data contains only 10 countries. The 1930s data report
life expectancy at birth and real income per capita for 38 countries.
35rate of productivity, i.e. a pair (z;g), such that the model matches the income per
capita of the economy relative to the benchmark economy as described in Table 1 for
1950 and 2005. Life expectancy of the generations reaching 35 in 1950 and 2005 are
dictated by the relationships estimated in step 1.
36Table 1: GDP per Capita and Schooling across Countries
1950 2005
Decile y50 s50 y05 s05 s05=s50
1 0:05 1:27 0:06 5:07 3.99
2 0:07 1:65 0:07 6:79 4.12
3 0:10 2:82 0:18 8:47 3.00
4 0:13 1:88 0:13 8:01 4.26
5 0:18 3:55 0:31 10:29 2.90
6 0:21 3:34 0:24 9:16 2.74
7 0:24 4:23 0:33 10:36 2.45
8 0:37 5:30 0:57 10:56 1.99
9 0:59 6:73 0:71 11:74 1.74
10 0:83 8:11 0:78 11:08 1.37
R10=1 16:60 6:39 13:00 2:19 -
R9=1 11:80 5:30 11:83 2:32 -
Note: y is real GDP per capita relative to that of the United
States and s is average years of schooling of the 25-29 year old
population. Numbers reported are the average of each decile. The
countries in each decile are the same in each year and represent
the 1950 distribution of GDP per capita.
Table 2: Calibration
Preferences  = 0:04,  = 3:39,  = 1:92
 = 0:0,  = 1:39, ! = 1:96
Technology  = 0:1
 = 0:04,   = 0:13
Productivity g = 0:0199, z1795 = 1:0
Demography T = 0:1692   274:7819
37Table 3: Model's Implications { Baseline Experiment
Calibrated Parameters 1950 Results 2005 Results
z1795 g (%) T1915 T1970 Rel. y s 1   ` Rel. y s 1   `
0.01 2.77 21.7 35.9 0.05 1.7 112.6 0.06 5.1 66.0
0.05 2.18 24.0 39.2 0.07 2.4 82.6 0.07 6.0 63.6
0.02 3.15 27.4 42.5 0.10 2.9 81.4 0.18 7.2 58.6
0.12 2.06 29.9 45.1 0.13 3.7 68.8 0.13 8.1 56.7
0.03 3.1 33.0 49.8 0.18 4.3 68.2 0.31 10.3 48.3
0.10 2.44 34.4 48.9 0.21 4.7 65.7 0.24 10.0 48.3
0.07 2.78 35.7 50.6 0.24 5.0 65.3 0.33 10.8 45.8
0.07 3.03 39.8 53.4 0.37 6.2 62.9 0.57 12.3 41.7
0.23 2.54 44.2 55.9 0.59 7.9 54.6 0.71 13.5 39.4
0.91 1.93 47.4 57.4 0.83 9.7 45.2 0.78 14.3 38.3
1.00 1.99 49.2 58.5 1.00 10.5 43.6 1.00 14.9 37.7
Note: y is output per capita, s is average years of schooling, and 1   ` is hours worked. In
this experiment countries dier by the level and rate of growth of productivity (z and g)
and life expectancy in 1950 and 2005.
38Table 4: Model's Implications { The Eect of Equal Productivity Growth across Countries
Calibrated Parameters 1950 Results 2005 Results
z1795 g (%) T1915 T1970 Rel. y s 1   ` Rel. y s 1   `
0.05 1.99 21.7 35.9 0.05 2.0 91.4 0.05 5.1 66.0
0.07 1.99 24.0 39.2 0.07 2.5 80.7 0.06 6.0 63.7
0.10 1.99 27.4 42.5 0.10 3.2 72.2 0.10 7.1 60.5
0.13 1.99 29.9 45.1 0.13 3.7 68.7 0.13 8.1 56.8
0.17 1.99 33.0 49.8 0.18 4.4 66.1 0.17 10.1 51.4
0.20 1.99 34.4 48.9 0.21 4.8 65.1 0.19 9.9 49.5
0.22 1.99 35.7 50.6 0.24 5.1 64.2 0.22 10.7 47.7
0.34 1.99 39.8 53.4 0.37 6.4 59.5 0.32 12.2 43.1
0.57 1.99 44.2 55.9 0.59 8.2 50.7 0.55 13.5 39.7
0.83 1.99 47.4 57.4 0.83 9.7 45.5 0.81 14.3 38.2
1.00 1.99 49.2 58.5 1.00 10.5 43.6 1.00 14.9 37.7
Note: y is output per capita, s is average years of schooling, and 1   ` is hours worked. In
this experiment countries dier by the level of productivity (z) and life expectancy in 1950
and 2005. Productivity growth (g) is assumed the same across countries as in the benchmark
economy.
39Table 5: Model's Implications { The Eect of Equal Productivity Growth and Change in
Life Expectancy across Countries
Calibrated Parameters 1950 Results 2005 Results
z1795 g (%) T1915 T1970 Rel. y s 1   ` Rel. y s 1   `
0.05 1.99 21.7 31.0 0.05 2.0 91.4 0.04 3.9 67.6
0.07 1.99 24.0 33.3 0.07 2.5 80.7 0.06 4.5 65.5
0.10 1.99 27.4 36.7 0.10 3.2 72.2 0.09 5.4 62.0
0.13 1.99 29.9 39.2 0.13 3.7 68.7 0.12 6.3 58.1
0.17 1.99 33.0 42.3 0.18 4.4 66.1 0.16 7.5 52.6
0.20 1.99 34.4 43.7 0.21 4.8 65.1 0.18 8.1 50.3
0.22 1.99 35.7 45.0 0.24 5.1 64.2 0.20 8.6 48.4
0.34 1.99 39.8 49.1 0.37 6.4 59.5 0.31 10.5 43.4
0.57 1.99 44.2 53.5 0.59 8.2 50.7 0.53 12.5 39.8
0.83 1.99 47.4 56.7 0.83 9.7 45.5 0.80 14.1 38.3
1.00 1.99 49.2 58.5 1.00 10.5 43.6 1.00 14.9 37.7
Note: y is output per capita, s is average years of schooling, and 1   ` is hours worked. In
this experiment countries dier by the level of productivity (z) and life expectancy in 1950
and 2005. Productivity growth (g) and the change in life expectancy between 1950 and 2005
are assumed the same across countries as in the benchmark economy.
40Table 6: Model's Implications with  c Constant { Baseline Experiment
Calibrated Parameters 1950 Results 2005 Results
z1795 g (%) T1915 T1970 Rel. y s 1   ` Rel. y s 1   `
- - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - -
0.20 1.64 44.4 55.9 0.59 6.7 62.6 0.71 12.9 44.0
0.94 0.96 47.4 57.4 0.83 9.4 46.7 0.78 14.3 40.4
1.00 1.05 49.2 58.5 1.00 10.4 44.4 1.00 15.1 38.9
Note: y is output per capita, s is average years of schooling, and 1   ` is hours worked. In
this experiment countries dier by the level and rate of growth of productivity (z and g)
and life expectancy in 1950 and 2005.
41Figure 1: Average Years of Schooling Population 25 to 29 { Selected Years








































































GDP per capita (log scale)






GDP per capita (log scale)
Note: The source of data is Barro and Lee (2010) for schooling and the Conference
Board (2010), Total Economy Database for GDP per capita. The horizontal axis
measures GDP per capita relative to the United States. The vertical axis measures
average years of schooling for the 25-29 population.
42Figure 2: Income Elasticity of Schooling across Countries






















































Note: For each year, we regress log average years of schooling on a constant and log
real GDP per capita across countries in our sample. The slope coecient is plotted for
each year.
43Figure 3: Years of School Completed at age 35 { Model and U.S. Data



















Figure 4: Work Hours { Model and U.S. Data



















44Figure 5: Work Hours across Countries






































Note: Average annual hours per worker from the Conference Board (2010), Total
Economy Database.
Figure 6: Model with Constant  c and U.S. Data
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